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SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON A 
LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 
THOMAS GUTMANN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
There is no such thing as a non-liberal theory of contract. Because the 
normative structure underlying the concept of contract is basically and 
essentially a liberal one,1 non-liberal approaches fail to grasp its meaning. They 
may, at best, be able to denote limits of the realm of contracts, but because they 
cannot explain what contracts are, non-liberal approaches lead to contract 
theories built around a void.2 There are some theoretical implications to be 
derived from this.3 When dealing with the challenges of the liberal approach—
for example, with the problem of unequal power relations between contracting 
parties—the crucial question is which normative tools are compatible with the 
very idea of a contract in order to qualify as a part of a theory of contract.4 
II 
THE LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 
The liberal theory of contract (as is sketched in quite broad strokes here) 
locates the normative foundations of the institution “contract” in individual 
rights, especially in freedom of contract. Contracts, in the liberal conception, 
are tools for realizing individual self-determination by means of voluntarily 
entering legally binding agreements. This notion of individual autonomy is not 
ahistorically given; rather, it was established and expanded through the social 
struggles that transformed the main determinant in our lives from “status to 
contract.”5 Guaranteeing this sphere of individual self-determination as a 
structural feature of liberal societies (“contract societies,” as Weber called 
them,6 or the “régime of contract” in Spencer’s words7) is the public dimension 
of contract. 
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 1.  See infra Part II. 
 2.  See infra Part III. 
 3.  See infra Part IV. 
 4.  See infra Part V. 
 5.  HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, 
AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 170 (1861). 
 6.  MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT: GRUNDRISS DER VERSTEHENDEN  
SOZIOLOGIE 399 (5th ed. 1980).  
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The liberal theory of contract is based upon the concept of respect for 
persons as agents and bearers of individual rights—including freedom of 
contract, the right to have their voluntary agreements respected. It conceives of 
private law only as “a system of reciprocal limits on freedom”8 and of contract 
law as a legal institution that, in general, recognizes and respects the power of 
private individuals to effect changes in their legal relations inter se.9 
According to the liberal theory, the implicit dimension of a contract is a 
relationship of mutual recognition between the individuals party to it. The 
particular pattern of this form of mutual recognition—“legal recognition,” in 
Axel Honneth’s terms10—respects the other party as equal, as a legal person 
capable of following her own conception of the good and of raising accepted 
claims. Thus, the notion of contract is deeply rooted in a universal respect for 
the equal autonomy of persons, and not in the non-egalitarian kinds of 
recognition embodied in relationships of love and of solidarity (that is, 
relationships based on a shared orientation towards values).11 
This basic rationale for a liberal contract theory is not market-oriented. 
Instead, its focus on autonomy rights and equality demands priority of the right 
before the good, embracing the conviction that basic individual freedoms 
impose limits on the collective search for the good life.12 In the history of ideas, 
this one was not fully developed until the legal philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and 
Hegel.13 
The notions of “autonomy,” “equality,” and “rights” used here require some 
clarification. Autonomy, in a liberal theory of contract, is a formal notion of 
agency freedom. The subject matter of law, and especially of contract law, is 
free from any perfectionist or moral content—what Kant called “Willkür.”14 
The question whether a person is autonomous (or acts autonomously) has 
different functions in different normative settings. For reasons of social 
inclusion and equality, the notion of “autonomy”—regarding a person’s claim 
 
 7.  HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE, WITH SIX ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT,  
SOCIETY AND FREEDOM 1, 17, 94 (1884). 
 8.  Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1394 
(2006). 
 9.  Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 29, 
37 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
 10.  AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE MORAL GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL 
CONFLICTS 109 (1996). 
 11.  For the misleading freedom-versus-solidarity dichotomy, see, for example, Roberto M. Unger, 
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 616, passim (1983). For the notion of 
“contractual solidarity,” see BRIGITTA LURGER, VERTRAGLICHE SOLIDARITÄT 132 (1998) and Gert 
Brüggemeier et al., Social Justice in European Contract Law: a Manifesto, 10 EUR. L.J. 653, 656 (2004).  
 12.  See generally John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
251 (1988). 
 13.  Cf. Bernhard Jakl, Die Autonomie des Rechts. Das Vernunftrecht der klassischen deutschen 
Philosophie in Geschichte und Gegenwart 88 et seq. (Nov. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 14.  IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, in 6 KANT’S GESAMMELTE 
SCHRIFTEN 230 (Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften 1902–1923).  
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for respect as an agent who is entitled to choose her own path and follow it 
(such as by making contracts)—has to be a low-threshold concept. Autonomy 
must be the default case, at least for adults. If a person is competent—if she 
fulfills the minimum requirements of rationality, self-reflection, and self-
control—she must be considered autonomous, independent of the extent to 
which she meets ideal conceptions of autonomous personhood or positive 
liberty. “Autonomy” in this sense is a binary concept, a range property.15 Were 
it not—were autonomy an ideal condition instead of the default—the 
fundamental assumption of our legal systems (and of our conceptions of moral 
rights) that, in general, individuals have normative competency for their 
decisions would lose its foundation and refer to paternalistic tutelage of the 
average citizen. 
Up to a certain point, the concept of equality inherent in the notion “equal 
autonomy of persons” is also a formal one. Persons are equal as legal entities 
regarding their right to form their own concept of the good and to act upon it. 
Notwithstanding Marx’s derision,16 the very notion of a contract cannot do 
without the idea that basically competent, adult persons, different and unequal 
in every empirical aspect, meet each other as equals at the basic level of law—
equal in dignity, equal in their basic rights and abilities, and equal in their 
entitlement to make use of their rights by entering mutually binding 
agreements. At this basic normative level, contract theory—like every coherent 
conception of juridical equality—must regard “its addressees not in all their 
particularity, but as identical abstract beings.”17 
Individual rights in the liberal theory of contract must be (and are) 
understood in a non-consequentialist way, as “legally respected choices” in 
H.L.A. Hart’s terms.18 Private autonomy must be (and is) based on a “will” 
theory of individual rights that understands rights as a means for guaranteeing 
legally protected spheres of freedom of choice, not as serving objective 
“interests” or benefiting their bearers,19 which is an inherently paternalistic 
concept. 
 
 15.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 508 (1971). 
 16.  Karl Marx, Zur Judenfrage [On the Jewish Question], in I KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH 
ENGELS, WERKE 347 (1976). 
 17.  William Lucy, Equality Under and Before the Law, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 411, 413 (2011); cf. 
Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 118, 143 
(Peter Benson ed., 2001) (describing “a very bare conception of the person”). 
 18.  H.L.A. HART, Legal Rights, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 162, 189, passim (1982). For this “will theory” of the function of rights, see 
FRIEDRICH C. V. SAVIGNY, I SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 7 (1840); CARL 
WELLMAN, A THEORY OF RIGHTS ch. 4 (1985); LEONARD W. SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION 
OF RIGHTS ch. 2, 46 et seq. (1987); HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS ch. 3 (1994). 
 19.  Cf. RUDOLF V. JHERING, 3.1 GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS § 60, 339 et seq. (4th ed. 1888); 
Neil MacCormick, Rights in Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY. ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
H.L.A. HART 189 (Peter M. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF 
FREEDOM ch. 7 et seq., 183 et seq. (1986); JOSEPH RAZ, Rights and Individual Well-Being, in ETHICS 
IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 29 (1994); DAVID 
LYONS, Utility and Rights, in RIGHTS, WELFARE, AND MILL’S MORAL THEORY 147 (1994). 
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Within the family of autonomy-based theories of contract law,20 the liberal, 
rights-based approach need not refer to the convention and social practice21 of 
promising or to its underlying moral principle.22 The notion of contract is best 
captured in the legal, not moral, idea of a transfer of entitlements, which 
conceives of a contract as the consensual manifestation of an intention to 
alienate one’s right to another person.23 In contractual agreements, the parties 
consent to be legally bound, that is, to impose legal obligations to be 
performed.24 
III 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
A.  Outside Normative Reasoning 
Law is a form of normativity. Therefore, legal theory sensu stricto is a 
normative endeavour. One role of a liberal theory of private law is to scrutinize, 
and criticize, the normative claims (and thus the prescriptive force) of 
competing, non-liberal theories. Some of those normative claims fail in a very 
fundamental way, as demonstrated in the following two short examples. 
1.  Short Circuits Between “Is” and “Ought” 
Sociological jurisprudence as such is not a basis for a legal theory of 
contract. In particular, there is no direct way to derive any sort of sound 
normative claims from Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, a descriptive, 
sociological second-order observation of the legal system from without (albeit 
very probably the one with the greatest explanatory power25). At least this is 
what Luhmann has been telling us.26 Of course, observation of the functional 
differentiation of autopoietically closed social systems that process meaning 
(“Sinn”27) by different codes cannot lead to a criterion for normative 
 
 20.  Benson, supra note 9, at 37. 
 21.  CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 8–
20 (1981). For a differentiated view, see DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A 
LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT (2003). 
 22.  T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 86 
(Peter Benson ed., 2001). 
 23.  See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986); 
Ripstein, supra note 8, at 1407; Thomas Gutmann, Iustitia Contrahentium. Zu den 
gerechtigkeitstheoretischen Grundlagen des deutschen Schuldvertragsrechts 185 et seq. (July 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For a specific approach on transfer of ownership, see 
Benson, supra note 17, at 127 et seq.  
 24.  Herein lies the answer to “Atiyah’s problem” of why a promisee is entitled to expect the 
promisor not to change his mind. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 127 et seq. 
(1981); cf. Benson, supra note 9, at 37. 
 25.  Bijan Fateh-Moghadam, Rezeption in der Rechtswissenschaft, in LUHMANN-HANDBUCH  293 
(Oliver Jahrhaus, Armin Nassehi & Mario Grizelj eds., 2012). 
 26.  See NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 16 et seq., 31, 83 (1993). 
 27.  LUHMANN, supra note 26, at 214, 255. 
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acceptability of any given law.28 This is, however, what the theory of law as an 
autopoietic system, an approach influential mainly in Germany and associated 
with Gunther Teubner and his disciples, claims. That claim gives rise to a severe 
problem by acting as, or at least impersonating, a normative theory—that is, by 
putting forward a lot of claims regarding how the law, especially private law, 
should be. Its authors, however, do not attempt to offer any normative 
reasoning to justify their normative premises, except for their unexplained short 
cut from description to prescription. Analyzed in methodological respects, this 
short cut, which derives legal imperatives from the mere fact of functional 
differentiation between social systems, seems to rely on some sort of mystic 
revelation, accessible only to a precious few. Or it might be a variation of the 
concrete-order thinking prominent in national socialist legal theory (such as 
that of Carl Schmitt and Karl Larenz29), which claims that it is social order itself 
that contains its own law—that is, its own ideals regarding what the law ought to 
do, thereby producing normativity out of social facts by a short circuit between 
“is” and “ought” (or some sort of ideological interpretation of what “is,” 
respectively). As a normative theory, the law-as-an-autopoietic-system 
approach is arbitrary, with a large normative void at its center. Today’s 
contracts may be exposed to a fractured and contradictory multiplicity of highly 
developed social rationalities,30 but nothing results from this for a normative 
legal theory of contract. No normative reasons are given for the normative 
claims that the law, including private law, should give up its basic reference to 
persons and their rights, that the real task of the law should be to serve 
transindividual structures like social systems and systemic evolution, by 
balancing and doing justice to competing systemic imperatives,31 and that 
constitutional rights should predominantly protect systems, not individuals, as 
autonomous spheres of social action.32 If we were to take that seriously, some 
nasty questions would be posed, and not only by adherents of liberal theories of 
law. To start with, the theory would face problems with its interpretation of the 
normative coherence of the legal system. 
 
 28.  See, e.g., LUHMANN, supra note 26, at 83. 
 29.  See, e.g., BERND RÜTHERS, DIE UNBEGRENZTE AUSLEGUNG. ZUM WANDEL DER 
PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNG IM NATIONALSOZIALISMUS 277 et seq. (7th ed. 2012). 
 30.  See Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 9 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUD. 399 (2000). 
 31.  GUNTHER TEUBNER, RECHT ALS AUTOPOIETISCHES SYSTEM ch. 6 (1989); DAN WIELSCH, 
ZUGANGSREGELN. DIE RECHTSVERFASSUNG DER WISSENSTEILUNG 269, passim (2008); Dan 
Wielsch, Die epistemische Analyse des Rechts, 64 JURISTENZEITUNG 67 (2009); Dan Wielsch, Iustitia 
mediatrix: Zur Methode einer soziologischen Jurisprudenz, in SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GUNTHER TEUBNER 395 (Gralf-Peter Calliess et al. eds., 2009). 
 32.  See generally  Gunther Teubner, Ein Fall von struktureller Korruption? Die Familienbürgschaft 
in der Kollision unverträglicher Handlungslogiken, 83 KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 388 (2000) 
(moderating somewhat Christoph B. Graber & Gunther Teubner, Art and Money: Constitutional Rights 
in the Private Sphere?, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (1998)).  
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2.  The Foucaultian Trap 
For structural reasons, many critical theories and most manifestations of the 
Critical Legal Studies movement are not only unwilling but unable to justify any 
particular first-order normative principle. Such theories portray private-law 
adjudication as merely a battlefield for the ideological projects of legal factions, 
legal interpretation as inevitably rife with externally motivated, strategic 
reasoning.33 By doing so, they create an image of law disintegrated and 
pervaded by irresolvable basic contradictions and antinomies—formalism 
versus functionalism, individualism versus collectivism, and so on. 
The normative task of legal theory gets lost in that disintegration. The 
critical approaches fall into what may be called the “Foucaultian trap”: if law 
(the world)—as in Foucault’s Nietzschean theory of the 1970s—is nothing but a 
perennial fight over interpretations within all-embracing power relations, if 
reasons are but tactical tools, all that the theorist can do is arbitrarily take sides 
in the power game. She can no longer provide normative reasons or 
justifications for her positions.34 A theory of contract sensu stricto, however, 
cannot do without normative justifications, and that is why poststructuralist 
critique tends to get so boring. Because these non-liberal theories fail from the 
outset to address the realm of normative reasons, they fail as theories of 
contract. 
B.  Alternative Normative Paradigms? 
1.  Multiplicity and Contradictions 
As Peter Benson notes, “the world of contract theory presents itself as a 
multiplicity of mutually exclusive approaches with their own distinctive contents 
and presuppositions.”35 Let us take a short look at some attempts to specify, 
based on normative claims, alternative prescriptive accounts36 of contract—
accounts that understand contract and contract law to serve a particular social 
value independent of the parties’ autonomy. Some brief and incomplete 
sketches will have to suffice. 
What should attract our attention first are the extreme contradictions in the 
approaches presenting themselves as alternatives to the autonomy model. Even 
the concepts of welfarism or social justice in contract law are ridden by internal 
conflicts and cannot be reduced to any coherent structure of ideas.37 Moreover, 
 
 33.  DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) (1997); R. M. Unger, 
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 616–33 (1983); STANLEY FISH, THE 
TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (1999). For example, Marxist criticisms of law reduce normativity to 
nothing more than class interests, and their poststructuralist variations confine themselves to seeking 
the social power structures underlying legal realities.  
 34.  See Nancy Fraser, Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions, 1 
PRAXIS INTERNATIONAL 272, 281 et seq. (1981); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY. TWELVE LECTURES 266 et seq. (F. Lawrence trans., 1987). 
 35.  Benson, supra note 9, at 29. 
 36.  See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 4 (2004). 
 37.  Thomas Wilhelmsson, Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law, 10 EUR. L.J. 712 
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a closer look at the other alternatives shows that they share no common 
normative ground whatsoever: the social-justice-in-contract-theory talk, 
Teubner’s idiosyncratic use of systems theory, Aristotelians’ nostalgic virtue 
moralism, the hard-boiled consequentialist collectivism of the classical law-and-
economics approach to contract theory—these approaches are, normatively, 
mutually exclusive. The liberal theory of contract could very probably just relax, 
lean back, and watch them neutralize one another. Likewise, although the 
liberal theory is prepared to justify its own normative claims, it could operate 
mainly as a form of “happy positivism,”38 since normative individualism and the 
notion of private autonomy guaranteed by individual rights are deeply 
embedded in the normative foundations of Western legal systems. Given the 
weight of normative individualism within any coherent interpretation or 
reconstruction of Western legal systems (especially Western contract law 
systems), one should ask whether there is a meaningful “choice of paradigm” 
for the theory of contract at all. Normative coherence clearly seems to be on the 
side of the liberal theory of contract. 
2.  Aristotelian Phantom Pain 
According to the liberal theory, a meaningful concept of contract has very 
limited compatibility with pre-modern concepts of contractual justice. In the 
liberal framework, Aristotelian or Thomist notions of a statical iustitia 
commutativa or aequalitas are meaningless from the start, whether brought 
forward in a neoclassical (Gordley39) or a seemingly hybrid way (Weinrib40). The 
reason for this is that the Aristotelian tradition, based on a theory that does not 
clearly distinguish contract from tort,41 lacks any understanding of private 
autonomy. Before the watershed of Normative Modernity,42 which started with 
Hobbes replacing virtues and duties with rights as the central element of legal 
normativity, no concept was able to grasp the specifically modern institution of 
 
(2004). 
 38.  Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 141 (A.E. Sheridan Smith trans., 
2002). 
 39.  See, e.g., James Gordley, Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in THE THEORY OF 
CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 265 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); James Gordley, The Moral Foundations 
of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2002). 
 40.  See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Aristotle’s Forms of Justice, 2 RATIO JURIS 211 (1989); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
(2012). For an analysis that regards Ernest Weinrib’s approach of developing a formal idea of private 
law from Aristotelian and Kantian building blocks and of understanding corrective justice as the special 
morality intrinsic to private law’s collapse into Aristotelian essentialism, see GUTMANN, supra note 23, 
at 349. The Aristotelian conception of iustitia correctiva sive commutativa is not “inchoately Kantian,” 
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra, at 83, but is incompatible with the Kantian concept of 
law and anything but formal, see Joseph Raz, Formalism and the Rule of Law, in NATURAL LAW 
THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 309, 329 et seq. (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
 41.  JAN DIRK HARKE, VORENTHALTUNG UND VERPFLICHTUNG. PHILOSOPHISCHE ANSICHTEN 
DER AUSTAUSCHGERECHTIGKEIT UND IHR RECHTSHISTORISCHER HINTERGRUND 11 et seq., 98 
(2005). 
 42.  Thomas Gutmann, Religion und Normative Moderne, in MODERNE UND RELIGION. 
KONTROVERSEN UM MODERNITÄT UND SÄKULARISIERUNG 447 (Ulrich Willems et al. eds., 2012). 
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contract as a tool for realizing the individual self-determination guaranteed by 
liberty rights. The virtue ethics of the commutative-justice perspective “sees law 
as a tool for enforcing decent behaviour in a society.”43 That perspective is 
therefore neither compatible with the “fact of reasonable pluralism”44 regarding 
what constitutes the good life characteristic of social conditions secured by the 
basic rights and liberties of free institutions, nor with any normative concept 
rooted in individual liberties, nor with the functional differentiation of ethics 
and law. Pace Gordley, a modern notion of contract is necessarily a 
voluntaristic concept, placing “a value on choice that is independent of the 
value of what the parties have chosen,”45 and it allows no conceivable 
justification for the principle that transactions may not alter given distributions 
of holdings. It is not only that the idea of iustum pretium cannot claim 
normative priority over contractual autonomy: it is that that idea has no 
theoretical connection to contractual autonomy at all, notwithstanding that its 
fragments are still to be found in European private law systems. 
3.  Economic Analysis of Contract Law and the Separateness of Persons 
Economic analysis of contract law46 does provide a clear prescriptive 
criterion: contracts and contract law are to serve as tools for efficiency, for 
maximization of wealth. Due to its basic consequentialist (teleological) 
structure, however, the efficiency criterion is incompatible with any contract law 
based on individual (autonomy) rights as legally respected choices. Within the 
normative-economic-analysis approach to contract law, all contracting parties 
and all the parties’ rights are subordinated to the collective good of efficiency 
maximization. Teleological theories focused on maximizing a particular 
criterion cannot deal with the separateness of persons.47 Lacking a discrete 
criterion for the distribution of benefits and burdens, they always allow for the 
sacrifice of one person’s interests or rights if her loss is outweighed by the 
aggregated collective advantage. Neither separate persons nor their rights, nor 
the binding force of their agreements are of intrinsic importance in the end. The 
very idea behind the theory of incomplete contracts—its cheapest-cost-avoider, 
cheapest-insurers, and superior-risk-bearer criteria, and its claim for 
requirement of an efficient breach of contract—is to make contracting parties 
trustees and functionaries of collective-wealth maximization. Legal systems 
based on individual rights, however, have a strong anti-utilitarian or anti-
consequentialist bias, because rights define side constraints to maximizing 
strategies. Insofar as the starting principle of contract law is contractual 
 
 43.  Wilhelmsson, supra note 37, at 717. 
 44.  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (1993). 
 45.  Gordley, supra note 39, at 268 (2001). 
 46.  Cf. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS chs. 5 & 8, (3d 
ed. 2003); ROBERT COOTER, THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS ch. 8 (6th ed. 2012); STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 3 (2004). 
 47.  Rawls, supra note 15, at 27; H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828 
(1979). 
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freedom, a contract is a deontological notion. (This alone explains the almost 
complete failure of the law and economics approach to gain any influence in 
contract law and adjudication in Germany, for example.) The point to be 
stressed here is that, although economic analysis of contract law has produced 
an impressive body of scholarship on the economics of contract law, its goal of 
efficiency maximization is normatively incompatible with a legal theory of 
contract based upon a concept of respect for persons as bearers of individual 
rights, able to effectively bind themselves in voluntary agreements. The two 
normative principles remain unconnected; at best, they are understood as a 
trade-off between incommensurable goals.48 So far, economic analysis of law has 
failed to produce a legal theory of contract compatible with the normative 
premises of legal systems predicated on individual rights. 
4.  Social Justice in Contracts 
It seems to be an especially unsatisfying theoretical move to claim, along 
with Martijn Hesselink and others (in a manifesto of the “Study Group on 
Social Justice in European Private Law”), that social justice has to be a defining 
element of European contract law and of the very notion of contract.49 The 
manifesto does not give even a hint about what the theoretical concept aimed at 
in contract might be. In a later publication, a study for the European 
Parliament, the only substantial element out of five given by Hesselink as 
constituting the “European notion of social justice in private law” is that the 
Common Frame of Reference for European contract law “should contain a 
sufficient level of protection of weaker parties. In particular, where a distinction 
is made between different groups of people this should be done in a way that is 
favourable to the least privileged (Rawls’ difference principle).”50 
But for Rawls, who provides a Kantian liberal theory, the realm of contracts 
is to be guided not by the difference principle, but exclusively by the first 
principle of justice: the Kantian liberty principle, which demands the most 
extensive adequate scheme of equal rights and basic liberties possible, subject 
to the condition that the same scheme applies for all. For Rawls, the difference 
principle is a background condition, a principle governing the basic structure of 
society. The principles governing individual transactions—those that make up 
contract law—operate independently within that basic structure. They 
guarantee that “individuals and associations are . . . left free to advance their 
ends more effectively within the framework of the basic structure, secure in the 
 
 48.  EYAL ZAMIR, BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY 257 et seq. (2010); see 
also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 241 et seq., 248 (1993). For 
the methodological side of this issue, see Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 689 et seq. (J. Coleman & S. Shapiro 
eds., 2002). 
 49.  See Gert Brüggemeier et al., supra note 11. 
 50.  MARTIJN W. HESSELINK, CFR & SOCIAL JUSTICE: A SHORT STUDY FOR THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT ON THE VALUES UNDERLYING THE DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: WHAT ROLES FOR FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE? 22 (2008). 
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knowledge that elsewhere in the social system the necessary corrections to 
preserve background justice are being made.”51 Contracts, Rawls says, are 
unrestrained by duties of social justice because rules enforcing such duties 
“would be an excessive if not an impossible burden.”52 This is but a friendly 
version of Savigny’s dictum that, in contract law, you may let your contracting 
partner starve, as long as public law takes care of him.53 
For Rawls, private law, especially contract law, secures for individuals the 
capacity to set and pursue their own conception of the good, in the face of other 
individuals’ equally valid claims to do likewise.54 Therefore, contractual 
relations between private individuals must not be subordinated to distributive 
concerns.55 “The aggregative effects of contractual transactions may lead to 
distributive injustice that needs to be addressed through public law,”56 but not 
by interfering in specific contracts or by imposing duties of social justice on 
certain private parties. 
In the final analysis, welfarist contract law in a strict sense would be 
conceivable only on the assumption that individuals have a direct, positive, 
enforceable responsibility towards other individuals and their well-being, that 
is, that persons have direct claims against each other for assistance in the pursuit 
of their good. This premise seems to have no sound theoretical justification. In 
short, the social-justice approach is unable to create an alternative paradigm of 
contract,57 and, when it presents itself not as a full alternative but as a 
complementary correction of the liberal approach58 (with the “concern to strike 
 
 51.  Rawls, supra note 44, at 268 et seq.; see also Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility 
and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2004). Rawls’ “Theory of Justice” made it clear 
from the start that it was not dealing with contractual agreements. See Rawls, supra note 15, at 8. 
 52.  Rawls, supra note 44, at 266. 
 53.  SAVIGNY, supra note 18, at § 56, 370 et seq.  
 54.  Ripstein, supra note 8, at 1409. 
 55.  Therefore, the thesis that “[f]or Rawlsianism, contract law is properly understood as one of the 
many loci of distributive justice” is a severe misreading based on the claim that “the Rawlsian text is 
confused.” Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 598, 600, 621 (2005). The whole debate on whether for Rawlsian political philosophy private law 
lies outside or inside the scope of the two principles of justice is misleading, and the claim that “[i]f 
contract law is within the basic structure (in whole or in part), it is governed by the two principles of 
justice” is a non sequitur. Id. at 608. For Rawls, contracts and the right to contract are governed by the 
first principle of justice alone. 
 56.  See Rawls, supra note 44, at 268; Ripstein, supra note 51, at 1815.  
 57.  This is particularly true for Thomas Wilhelmsson’s “anti-traditionalist model” of contract as 
social cooperation, where the very idea of contract is dissolved by a functionalization of agreements in 
order to serve dynamic and flexible content-orientation depending on the changing “social and 
economic needs” of the parties and the (conflicting) collectivist ends of parties’ social networks and 
society at large, that is, “as a tool of rational distribution” in the society. So why keep the institution of 
contract at all? See Wilhelmsson, Questions for a Critical Contract Law: And a Contradictory Answer: 
Contract as Social Cooperation, in PERSPECTIVES OF CRITICAL CONTRACT LAW 9, 38 et seq., 41 
(Thomas Wilhelmsson ed., 1993). 
 58.  See Florian Rödl, Contractual Freedom, Contractual Justice, and Contract Law (Theory), 76 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 57; BRIGITTA LURGER, GRUNDFRAGEN DER 
VEREINHEITLICHUNG DES VERTRAGSRECHTS IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION 457 et seq. (2002).  
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a balance between private autonomy and fairness”59), it produces a mere 
addendum, unable to give a coherent account of the bipolar normative structure 
it creates. Its idea of social justice stays extraneous to the idea of contract; it is 
just setting up a clothesline between them.60 Moreover, by failing to take the 
“weak” seriously as legal persons and by treating them as objects of protection 
and not as persons deciding for themselves,61 the social-justice approach harms 
not only the egalitarian commitment of law, but also the inclusionary role of 
juridical equality, which has to ascribe the same legal status to all.62 Perhaps 
politics (even good politics) makes bad legal theory. For those accustomed to 
the theory of social systems,63 this is not news anyway. 
5.  Constitutional Rights and Contracts 
The liberal theory of contract is perfectly compatible with proposals for a 
total constitution, that is, for constitutional rights framing contract law. As 
Hugh Collins remarked, this proposal indeed derives from a demand for the 
unity of legal order,64 for coherence of norms within the legal system. This 
requirement for coherence, or for what Dworkin calls “integrity,”65 seems to be 
a necessary condition for legitimacy of modern legal systems. 
Constitutionalizing private law, however, will not do the trick for the social-
justice-in-contract-law approach. In fact, constitutionalizing private law favors 
the liberal theory of contract, since freedom of contract is rooted in 
constitutional protection of liberties. Where such liberties are protected—in 
Germany, for example—a further constitutionalization of contract law would 
not change anything.66 The state’s positive constitutional duty to intervene in 
 
 59.  See Gert Brüggemeier et al., supra note 11, at 654. 
 60.  See, e.g., Martijn W. Hesselink, Capacity and Capability in European Contract Law 62 
(Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics No. 2005-09), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=869246 (“[P]rivate law can be placed on a continuum from autonomy to 
solidarity”). A similar conception of a simple, incoherent dichotomy is found in Lurger, who inductively 
claims solidarity (“party protection” or concern for “regard and fairness” in contractual relations) to be 
situated “on the very same level as the principle of freedom of contract, without any signs of 
subordination to the latter,” although both “basic values” are conceived to be in conflict with each 
other, Brigitta Lurger, The Future of European Contract Law Between Freedom of Contract, Social 
Justice, and Market Rationality, 1 EUR. R. CONTRACT L. 442, 448, 453 (2005), and in Wilhemsson’s 
dichotomy between traditional contract law following the rationality of the market and “social contract 
law” oriented towards the personal, social, and economic “needs” of the parties, THOMAS 
WILHELMSSON, CRITICAL STUDIES IN PRIVATE LAW: A TREATISE ON NEED-RATIONAL PRINCIPLES 
IN MODERN LAW xii, 68, 146 et seq. (1992). Note, consumer-welfarism is much closer to market 
functionalism than liberal contract theory. 
 61.  See, e.g., Hesselink, supra note 60. 
 62.  Lucy, supra note 17, at 442. 
 63.  See 1 NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY ch. 1 (Rhodes Barrett trans., 2012). 
 64.  Hugh Collins, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Contract Law in Europe 425 (Univ. of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1837429.  
 65.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 411 (1986). 
 66.  As Mattias Kumm noted, even a constitutional amendment explicitly establishing that 
constitutional rights have direct horizontal effects in Germany would not provide additional protection 
for weaker economic parties. “As a matter of substantive law and institutional division of labor, it 
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private relationships for the benefit of one party in order to protect that party’s 
constitutional rights67 already serves as the basis for regulations against 
coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, and (some forms of) duress. All of these 
protections are required by the liberal approach. 
A liberal theory of rights, however, will have serious reservations about 
attempts to turn human rights into a master key for simply moralizing the law. 
To start with, a liberal theory will make clear that it is constitutional rights that 
frame contract law, not constitutional “values.”68 There is a categorical 
difference between rights (as norms) and values. Norms are valid (or not); 
values are to be realized (more or less).69 The (liberal) idea of a total 
constitution at work is not a matter of realizing values, but of respecting rights 
and protecting them from infringement. Therefore, there cannot be such a thing 
as a constitutional right to positive freedom or a positive conception of liberty 
on the horizontal level between citizens or contracting parties. There is 
especially no such thing as a constitutional right to a “substantial”70 or 
“positive” form of contractual freedom.71 Making a contracting party 
responsible for the other party’s positive freedom of contract would amount to 
creating a duty to proactively provide a range of substantial, positive, 
meaningful options for the partner to choose from before contracting with him 
or her—it would, in other words, impose a duty to rearrange the contracting 
partner’s life. This notion is as absurd as the idea of directly (or even indirectly) 
applying social or economic human rights within the horizontal relationship of 
contracting individuals. 
Finally, respect for the dignity of the individual (according to Article 1 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) may well prove to 
be a limit on freedom of contract in exceptional cases.72 However, human 
dignity as the most fundamental norm expressing mutual recognition of legal 
persons as legal persons73 is hardly the right tool to serve as a placeholder for 
the intentions of the social-justice-in-contract-theory approaches. Again, it is 
the very notion of individual basic rights (and the non-consequentialist concept 
of autonomy that they presuppose) that stands in the way of theories promoting 
 
would simply leave things as they are. With the comprehensive scope of constitutionally protected 
interests in Germany, private law in Germany is already applied constitutional law.” Mattias Kumm, 
Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization 
of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341, 359 (2004). 
 67.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 19, 1993, 89 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 214 (Ger.).  
 68.  But see Collins, supra note 64, at 3.  
 69.  JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG 310 et seq. (1992). 
 70.  But see Collins, supra note 64, at 8.  
 71.  This latter notion was brought forward after the German Constitutional Court’s ruling in the 
Bürgschaftsvertrag case (a family-surety-contract case), for example. 89 BVERFGE 89. 
 72.  Collins, supra note 64, at 6 et seq.  
 73.  Thomas Gutmann, Struktur und Funktion der Menschenwürde als Rechtsbegriff, in 2 
LEBENSWELT UND WISSENSCHAFT. DEUTSCHES JAHRBUCH PHILOSOPHIE 309 (Carl Friedrich 
Gethmann ed., 2011). 
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paternalistic restrictions on freedom of contract whenever a transaction is said 
to be insufficiently conducive to the wellbeing of a party. 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS 
A liberal theory of contract is not a libertarian one; rather, it is perfectly 
compatible with policies of massive redistribution of wealth, benefits, or 
primary goods in favor of disadvantaged groups of persons. There is more to 
the law than absolute negative property rights understood as insurmountable 
side constraints for all forms of state or private action. 
Nonetheless, liberalism—of a Rawlsian kind, at least—tries to protect 
spheres of agency freedom and voluntary agreements that are not conceived of 
as mere means for collective ends. Understanding a contract from the 
perspective of the contracting parties’ freedom rights commits contract theory 
to concentrating on the parties’ internal relationship.74 For normative reasons, a 
contract demands an atomistic view. An external perspective of contract law—
one understanding a contract as serving a particular social value independent of 
the parties’ autonomy, as an instrument to realize social justice, virtues, non-
discrimination, efficiency—is exogenous to the notion of contract and its 
normative foundation. There is a substantive and a methodological 
consequence to be derived from this. 
First, the substantive consequence: Any functionalization of contracts for 
external ends curtails the realm of contracts (that is, the spheres of agency 
freedom enjoyed by legal persons mutually respecting each other as free and 
equal). There are some good reasons to limit private autonomy and freedom of 
contract, but it is always a question of curtailing, not defining it. There may be 
good reasons for using contract law to implement distributional goals when 
alternative ways of doing so are likely to be more costly or intrusive (Anthony 
Kronman suggested that this may be the case for usury laws and laws on 
minimum wages, habitability, and labor protection75). And maybe Hugh Collins 
is right in thinking that even the way to socialism leads through contract law,76 
but whenever contract law is used to further an end other than the parties’ 
freedom, something gets lost: the contract. So, from a theoretical point of view, 
the European Commission had a point when, in its presentation of the proposal 
for a Common Frame of Reference (CFR), it stated that in the CFR 
“contractual freedom should be the guiding principle; restrictions should only 
be foreseen where this could be justified with good reasons.”77 
 
 74.  Wilhelmsson, supra note 37, at 719 et seq. 
 75.  Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 473 (1980); see 
also Daphne Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
326 (2006). 
 76.  Hugh Collins, Social Market and the Law of Contract, 49 ARSP-BEIHEFT 85, 87 (1992). 
 77.  COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL: A MORE COHERENT EUROPEAN CONTRACT 
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Second, the methodological consequence: Legal theory in the strict sense (as 
opposed to theories regarding law) is a first-order reflection of the legal system 
it deals with. It is a reconstruction of the legal point of view. As such, it cannot 
proceed without some sort of normative-coherence theory, without some sort of 
theory that interprets statutes, court decisions, and their underlying normative 
principles and concepts in order to provide a consistent totality of rules. A 
coherent general theory of contract, reaching deeper than what Hanoch Dagan 
rightly calls the existing structural pluralism of contract institutions,78 is a 
precondition for the internal consistency and reasonableness the law must claim 
for its doctrines and principles.79 Likewise, any theory of contract has to make 
plausible that its conception of contractual obligation is implied by the basic 
doctrines of contract law, and that it, in turn, holds them together in one 
integrated whole.80 Therefore, a theory of contract has to start with reflection 
upon the organizing idea of the notion of contract—autonomy—and then it 
must try to build a consistent and coherent theory around it (which, of course, 
this article cannot do). In this endeavor for theoretical contract law scholarship, 
liberal contract theory aims at a coherent set of basic legal principles and 
institutions governing a justifiable law of contract (if not the complete body of 
it, leaving room for matters of convention, of determinatio,81 and of policies in 
specific doctrinal choices). 
It is for this reason that the liberal theory of contract holds all attempts to 
functionalize contracts for social or policy goals to be extrinsic to the concept of 
contract, unable to be developed as an integral part of contract theory even 
insofar as such goals are substantively or procedurally justifiable (as some are). 
Because the notion of contract is inherently founded on the idea of two or more 
persons realizing individual self-determination by means of voluntarily entering 
legally binding agreements, there is no such thing as a choice of paradigm for 
the theory of contract. Alternative paradigms necessarily fail to grasp the 
meaning of their object. They may at best denote (well-founded or not so well-
founded) limits of the realm of contracts, but they cannot explain what 
contracts are. They are built around a void. In order to grasp the core notion of 
a contract, alternative paradigms of contract theory have to be parasitic upon 
the liberal one. As long as alternative or mixed approaches are unable to 
explain the internal relationship between the normative core concept of 
contract and autonomy, on the one hand, and the external good they want 
contract law to serve, on the other hand, justification of “the intrusion of the 
 
LAW–AN ACTION PLAN, COM[2003] 68 FINAL, 16 (Feb. 12, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/com_2003_68_en.pdf. 
 78.  Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 19. 
 79.  See Dworkin, supra note 65; see also ROBERT ALEXY, THE ARGUMENT FROM INJUSTICE: A 
REPLY TO LEGAL POSITIVISM (2002); Benson, supra note 9, at 118. 
 80.  Benson, supra note 9, at 123 et seq. 
 81.  William Lucy, Philosophy and Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J., 75, 95 (2004). 
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values of the welfare state into the structure of contract law”82 or of any other 
instrumentalization of contract will inevitably lead to bad theory. From this 
perspective, the “productive disintegration of private law”83 results in the 
disintegration of private-law theory, and perceiving contract law as just another 
arm of the regulatory state84 is the self-abandonment of a theory of contract. 
That is why anyone who is not a political liberal may nevertheless have good 
reasons for sticking to a liberal theory of contract. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The liberal theory of contract, with its autonomy-based account of contract 
law, claims to be self-sufficient and complete in its own terms. For reasons of 
normative coherence, the liberal theory of contract starts with the central 
normative idea of contract, which is autonomy, and then builds a complex 
theory around it. In this approach, basically, the will of the parties defines the 
conception of justice. Therefore, contract law cannot be constituted by norms of 
substantive fairness. How, then, can a liberal theory of contract deal with 
“unjust” or “unequal” contracts (in the widest sense of these words) without 
falling into the theoretical traps of the alternative concepts sketched above? 
For such a theory, the number of possible legal concepts to deal with 
“unjust” or “unequal” contracts (in the widest sense of these words) is 
restricted to ones that can be shown to be consistent with the liberal core notion 
of contract. Substantive unfairness, inadequacy of consideration, or impaired 
bargaining power per se do not justify non-enforcement of a contract. At first 
glance, only the two forms of purely procedural grounds addressing a 
contracting party’s lack of voluntariness85 (and hence, of autonomy)—namely 
coercion (including some forms of duress and even undue influence) and 
mistake (including fraud, misrepresentation, and non-fulfilment of duties of 
disclosure)—are intrinsic aspects of a liberal theory of contract. Moreover, from 
the very idea of contract and from the relationship of mutual recognition 
between persons underlying it, an autonomy-based account of contract law is 
perfectly able to extract pre-contractual and contractual duties to inform, duties 
to cooperate, as well as duties of good faith and fair dealing, for example, when 
it comes to filling gaps in a contract or to modes of performance. There are even 
liberal reasons in favor of compulsory contracting under specific circumstances. 
 
 82.  Wilhelmsson, supra note 37, at 713; cf. ROGER BROWNSWORD, GERAINT HOWELLS, 
THOMAS WILHELMSSON, WELFARISM IN CONTRACT LAW (1994). 
 83.  Cf. HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 53 et seq. (1999).  
 84.  Collins, supra note 64, at 33 et seq. Perhaps it has to be admitted that the most sophisticated 
(albeit totalitarian) theoretical approach to understanding a contract as just another arm of the 
regulatory state is the national socialist theory of contract. See 1 KARL LARENZ, VERTRAG UND 
UNRECHT 56–93 et seq. (1936). 
 85.  Cf. THOMAS GUTMANN, 2 FREIWILLIGKEIT ALS RECHTSBEGRIFF 2 (2001). 
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The crucial question is whether the liberal theory of contract has to leave it 
at that. Investigation of whether there is a further “interpretation of contractual 
fairness that fits with the . . . non-distributive aspects of contract”86 is the main 
task for a liberal theory of contract today. 
There is at least one complex normative concept that has to be explored 
further: exploitation,87 in its strictly analytic—not Marxist—sense, describing 
(basically) a situation where a person takes unfair advantage of someone else’s 
vulnerabilities or desperation to strike a deal. Exploitation is a tricky concept, 
with a moral force less clear than coercion, since exploitation is compatible with 
voluntary action. Exploitation can be mutually beneficial; it may be harmful for 
an individual to be protected from being exploited, and it is far from clear which 
forms of exploitation should count as a kind of wrong that can justify state 
intervention. Nevertheless, a principle of non-exploitation comes closest to an 
idea of fairness intrinsic to a contract, to an idea recognizing and respecting 
individuals as autonomous subjects and equals. In this regard, Peter Benson has 
tried to show that a certain non-distributive reading of unconscionability 
covering the core concept of exploitation can be understood as a necessary 
element of the form and content of a contractual relation.88 His argument, to 
which I cannot do justice here, is based mainly on a specific Hegelian regulative 
assumption about the parties’ presumed intentions to give and receive equal 
value,89 thus ensuring that “parties can acquire rights against each other only in 
a way that respects the other throughout as an equal owner with a capacity for 
rights.”90 The Kantian liberal will have some problems digesting the argument in 
this form, which seems to depend on the Aristotelian heritage in Hegel’s theory, 
but it clearly points in the right direction. For reasons of coherence, processual 
accounts of contractual exploitation91 do, however, seem more promising. 
One of the interesting parts of a liberal theory of contract is how it translates 
these structurally different concepts into doctrine.92 Within the different 
national legal systems, autonomy-limiting coercion, on the one hand, and 
exploitation, on the other, are currently being addressed in a quite non-
systematic way by a plethora of theoretically blurry concepts—for example, by 
different notions of “coercion” or duress including economic duress, and certain 
aspects of undue influence and unconscionability (or “good morals,” in German 
 
 86.  Benson, supra note 9, at 123. 
 87.  See ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION (1996); Alan Wertheimer, Matt Zwolinski, 
Exploitation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2012), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/exploitation. 
 88.  Benson, supra note 9, at 184 et seq. 
 89.  Benson, supra note 9, at 187 et seq.; see also Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of 
a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1077, 1119 (1989).  
 90.  Benson, supra note 9, at 192. 
 91.  RICK BIGWOOD, EXPLOITATIVE CONTRACTS 196 et seq. (2004). 
 92.  For the common law of “Anglian” legal systems, see id. 
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law), respectively.93 The main task of a liberal theory of contract as a form of 
legal theory aiming at doctrine is to reconstruct these legal notions along the 
lines of the different analytical structure of the two concepts, coercion and 
exploitation. For a start, Articles 4.108 (Threats) and 4.109 (Excessive Benefit 
or Unfair Advantage, requiring a combination of procedural and substantive 
unfairness) of the Principles of European Contract Law94 do a good job here—a 
much better one than any national law. 
While the concept of exploitation stands for an attempt to gently broaden 
the “thin” concept of equality to which liberal legal theory is referring, a second 
option might be to change from the “thin” concept of autonomy it is based on 
over to more substantial ones. As Hanoch Dagan has demonstrated, drawing on 
Joseph Raz’s conception of the ideal of personal autonomy as self-authorship,95 
such a move might well lead to a pluralization of the until-now normative 
monism of autonomy-based theories of contracts like the one sketched here. 
 
 
 93.  Thomas Gutmann, Zwang und Ausbeutung beim Vertragsschluss, in NEW FEATURES IN 
CONTRACT LAW 49 (Reiner Schulze ed., 2007). 
 94.  OLE LANDO & HUGH BEALE, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (2000). The 
Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law have kept this model rule on 
exploitation. See Article II–7:207, in CHRISTIAN von BAR & ERIC CLIVE, 1 PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS 
AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW. DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE 
(DCFR) 507 (2009). 
 95.  Dagan, supra note 78. 
